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"Architecture becomes the tool of law when the direct action of the
law alone would not be as effective." -Lawrence Lessig'
I. INTRODUCTION
Both legal and technical attempts to regulate spam2 have proliferated
in recent years. As the problem of spam has grown to 12.4 billion messages
per day,3 legislatures, Internet service providers ("ISPs"), and software
developers have all tried various responses. Legislative responses have
culminated in the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography
and Marketing Act ("CAN-SPAM Act") of 2003. 4 Numerous e-mail clients
now include spam filters, and ISPs are using both technical and legal means
to strike back at spammers. Indeed, the Online community appears quite
united in its contempt for spam.
In spite of the numerous attempts to regulate spam, the problem has
not diminished. The spammers continue to win the war in spite of the
Internet community's best efforts. The recent CAN-SPAM Act has had
little effect.5 Legislative responses are limited by jurisdictional obstacles to
1. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 501, 512 (1999).
2. Spam can be broadly defined as junk e-mail. For an overview of how the term has
evolved to describe the problem of junk e-mail, see John Magee, The Law Regulating
Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail: An International Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 333, 336-38 (2003).
3. Spam Statistics 2004, at http://www.spamfilterreview.com/spam-statistics.html
(citing statistics for 2003) (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
4. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003) (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter CAN-SPAM Act 2003].
5. See, e.g., Grant Gross, Anti-spam Bill Won't End Junk Email, IDG News Service
(Dec. 26, 2003), at http://maccentral.macworld.com/news/2003/12/26/antispamlindex.php
?redirect= 1072424647000 [hereinafter Anti-spam Bill]; Grant Gross, State Spam Laws and
the New CAN-SPAM: The Federal Anti-spam Law Takes Precedence Over Most State Anti-
spam Provisions, INFOWORLD (Feb. 27, 2004), at http://www.infoworld.com/article/
04/02/27/09FEspamstatesjl.html ("In the first days of January, after the law went into
effect, spam-filtering companies measured no decrease in spain being sent across the
Internet.") [hereinafter State Spam Laws]; Cade Metz, Can E-Mail Survive?, PC MAG. (Feb.
17, 2004), at 55, at http://www.pcmag.com/print_article/0;2048,a=1 17514,00.asp
[hereinafter Can E-Mail Survive]; FTC: 'Can Spam' Law Only a Mild Deterrent, Fox NEWS
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enforcement and the technical measures taken by spammers to disguise
their source and identity. Technical approaches to dealing with spam, such
as spam filters and blacklists, have probably been more successful, but
have also faced their share of problems. Spam filters often struggle with
filtering too much or too little.6 Furthermore, filters fail to deter future
attempts, and spammers often find ways to circumvent the filters.
Blacklists and similar approaches represent an Online form of vigilantism
with many side effects.7 Innocent parties often have their messages
blocked,8 and there are few safeguards to make sure that parties are only
being blacklisted for good cause.9 David Sorkin has suggested that the
"[c]oordination of technical and legal mechanisms seems to be the most
promising approach to the spam problem."1° Despite the fact that many
people would agree with Sorkin, legislative and technical approaches to
stopping spam have yet to be coordinated. Sorkin suggests that this is
because the consensus required for such coordination is unlikely to be
achieved.1'
This Note argues that the universal low regard for spam makes such
coordination possible. Instead of making architectural changes that enforce
a particular legislative approach to spam, the focus should be an
architectural approach that enables both ISPs and end-users to more
effectively identify and filter unwanted spam. The law is not excluded from
this solution, rather it has an important role to play in enabling it.
This Note begins by outlining the techniques employed by spammers
to evade both technical and legal countermeasures, then goes on to explore
the costs spam shifts from mailers to recipients. The First Amendment
constraints placed upon any regulatory model are outlined, followed by a
suggested regulatory and architectural framework that could enable a
(Feb. 10, 2004), at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,110910,00.html; Eric J. Sinrod,
Junk E-mail Runs Rampant Despite CAN-Spam Act, USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2004), at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ericjsinrod/2004-03-25-sinrod-x.htm; Daniel
Nasaw, Federal Law Fails to Lessen Flow of Junk E-Mail, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at
D2.
6. Hiawatha Bray, As Spam War Heats Up, Many Valid E-mails Are Getting Lost,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2004, at A. 14, available at http://www.boston.com/business/
technology/articles/2004/02/18/aswar on-spam-heats-up-many.valid e mails.are-gettin
gilost/.
7. David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail,
35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325, 347 (2001).
8. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 679-82 (2003).
9. Id. at 677-79.
10. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 384.
11. Id.
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substantial reduction in spam while leaving filtering decisions in the hands
of individual e-mail users. The suggested architectural framework builds
upon several authentication-based systems being proposed by private
industry, but suggests key changes that can be made to afford more First
Amendment protection to e-mail and to allow individuals greater autonomy
in determining what e-mail they will receive.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Spammers' Tools
In order to understand the problem of spam, it is helpful to understand
the methods employed by spammers to exploit the e-mail medium. E-mail
operates on the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol ("SMTP").12 The protocol
was written in 1982,13 well before the problem of spam was a concern. As a
result, SMTP was not designed with the problem of spam in mind. No
allowances were made for the need to authenticate users, verify identity,
and guarantee message privacy or integrity. The only way recipients can
determine the source of spam is to rely upon the "From:" field and
"Received:" headers.14 A sample, excerpted from Stopping Spam, is shown
below:
12. See ALAN SCHWARTZ & SIMSON GARFINKEL, STOPPING SPAM 48 (1998). This simple
example shows a header in SMTP version 1.0. Subsequent versions of SMTP have made
these headers considerably more complex through the addition of extensions, but have failed
to make the process of identifying the true source of an e-mail any easier. See generally J.
Klensin, RFC 1869: SMTP Service Extensions, THE INTERNET SOCIETY: Internet
Engineering Task Force (Nov. 1995), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc 1869.txt.
13. See Jonathan B. Postel, RFC 821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, THE INTERNET
SOCIETY: Internet Engineering Task Force (Aug. 1982), at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc0821.txt. SMTP has been updated to version 1.1, but the protocol remains largely
insecure. J. Klensin, RFC 2821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol at 64, THE INTERNET
SOCIETY: Internet Engineering Task Force (Apr. 2001), at http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/
rfc282l.html [hereinafter RFC 2821].
SMTP mail is inherently insecure in that it is feasible for even fairly casual users to
negotiate directly with receiving and relaying SMTP servers and create messages
that will trick a naive recipient into believing that they came from somewhere else.
Constructing such a message so that the "spoofed" behavior cannot be detected by
an expert is somewhat more difficult, but not sufficiently so as to be a deterrent to
someone who is determined and knowledgeable.
Id.
14. The situation is complicated by the use of "Return-Path" and "Resent-From"
headers used by later variations of SMTP. Nevertheless, the analysis is largely unchanged.
These headers are also susceptible to forgery. See generally RFC 2821, supra note 13, at 64-
65; P. Resnick, RFC 2822: Internet Message Format at 27-29, THE INTERNET SOCIETY:
Internet Engineering Taskforce (Apr. 2001), at http://w.ww.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2822.html.
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From you@earth.solar.net Sat May 9 12:40:45 1998
Received: from jupiter.solar.net (jupiter.solar.net [1.4.4.7]) by
pluto.solar.net (8.8.7/8.8.7) with SMTP id KAB00332 for
<chrism@pluto.solar.net>; Sat, 9 May 1998 12:40:45 -0600
Received: from earth.solar.net (earth.solar.net [1.4.4.4]) by
jupiter.solar.net (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id MAA00395 for
<chris@jupiter.solar.net>; Sat, 9 May 1998 12:40:40 -0600
Date: Sat, 9 May 1998 12:40:30 -0600
From: you@earth.solar.net
To: Chris <chris@jupiter.solar.net>
Subject: Steel Pulse concert date
Message-ID: <19980509124030.0113 @earth.solar.net>
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.0
X-UIDL: 179c97f48 la77a5dal a8lO9409aOOafe
Hi Chris! 5
The "From:" field is the most obvious method of identifying tl~e
sender, but it is also a very unreliable way. It can be easily forged by the
message sender.16 Spammers rarely use an address they can be reached at in
the "From:" field, and quite often, the address has either been made up or is
the e-mail address of some innocent party. The "Received:" headers are a
more useful method of identifying spammers. A "Received:" header is
added by each host that relays the message from its source to its eventual
destination. Each of these headers lists the name and address of a system
that relayed the message, as well as the name and address of the system that
just passed it the message. Spanmers cannot prevent intermediary systems
from adding these headers. The headers still provide only minimal
protection because a thorough examination of the "Received:" header will
be required to identify the real source of the message.
Two well-known techniques utilized by spammers to confuse
message recipients are using open relay sites 7 to send their messages18 and
adding "Received:" headers of their own creation when sending a message.
Open relay sites are servers that allow themselves to be used by unknown
computers to send e-mail messages. Mail can be traced back to these
relays, but it is unlikely that the relay operator will be able to identify the
system that passed it the message. While servers that allow relaying are
15. SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 12, at 55-56.
16. Id. at 86.
17. In technical terms, an open relay site allows spammers to send their spam by asking
the relay system's Mail Transport Agent, rather than the spammer's own agent, to deliver e-
mail. See generally id. at 90-91.
18. Id. at 88-91.
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becoming less common as a result of the spam problem, they still exist and
are well-known by spammers. These relay sites are often blacklisted,
meaning that certain ISPs will not accept messages from them.' 9 While this
is helpful, it has the effect of blocking not only spam, but also legitimate
messages by other senders that may depend on the relay for mail
transport.2°
The second technique is the adding of bogus "Received:" headers.
However, this technique is less effective. The bogus headers add erroneous
information, but are not able to prevent the addition of accurate
"Received:" headers. This means a recipient can rely on the header that his
own server added (jupiter.solar.net in the example) and work back from
one header to the next, identifying whether the server is one he trusts at
each step.2' The message "id" can be used to verify the authenticity with
the administrator at each intermediary. Eventually, the false headers can be
identified.
Unfortunately, identifying the source mail server does not identify the
person and computer that actually authored and sent the message. In some
instances, the administrator of the source server will be able and willing to
identify the culprit, but in others, an administrator will be unwilling or
unable to do so. Regardless of how many ISPs are now actively disabling
the accounts of their customers who are sending spam, there are still ISPs
and open relays in the United States and abroad that are unwilling to
cooperate.
Spammers have been growing increasingly bold in their attempts to
send spam. A new technique being relied upon is to create spam zombies.
Spam zombies are computers owned by innocent third parties that are
hacked and used by spainmers to send spam."2 The owners of these spam
zombies are typically unaware that their machines have been taken over
until their ISP terminates their account. 23 The hacker who exploits these
third-party computers may be difficult or impossible to identify.
The architecture underlying e-mail has not been conducive to
effective spam regulation. Spam can often be filtered or blocked, but the
underlying architecture of e-mail provides an effective barrier between law
enforcement and the perpetrators of spam. Before spam can be effectively
19. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 347-48.
20. Id. at 347-50.
21. SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 12, at 91-93 (outlining this general method).






regulated, there must first be changes to the architecture underlying e-mail.
The architecture must be adapted to provide the ability to identify and
authenticate the senders of spam.
B. The Case for Spam Regulation
The magnitude of the spam problem has grown steadily since the
emergence of the World Wide Web. During the one year from the summer
of 2001 to the summer of 2002, spam increased by 450 percent.2 4 Spam is
highly problematic because it frequently features pornographic content;
unsolicited, commercial advertisements; and fraudulent, get-rich-quick
schemes; all sent from a carefully disguised source. Spam also represents a
computer security risk. Mass e-mails are a frequent source of computer
viruses.26 Increasingly, these viruses then turn infected computers into
sparmers .2' Legitimate businesses have avoided the use of unsolicited
spam to a large extent. They are motivated by the fear of generating ill will
among potential customers or concerns about the possible legal
consequences. Even ISPs have played a significant role in reducing the
amount of legitimate commercial spam by prohibiting the sending of spam
as a condition in their subscriber agreements. 28 As a result of the
predominantly nefarious content, the majority of spammers cannot claim
any substantial protection under the First Amendment for the speech
contained within the spam messages.29
The sending of spam results in a substantial shifting of costs from
advertisers to ISPs and e-mail recipients. In 2003, spam is estimated to
have cost companies worldwide $20.5 billion.3" Spammers are able to send
messages for minimal cost-the cost of their Internet access and mailing
lists.3 The costs of relaying messages, storing them, and downloading them
24. Michael B. Edwards, A Call to Arms: Marching Orders for the North Carolina
Anti-Spam Statute, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 93 (2002).
25. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 339-40.
26. See Tony Bradley, Solving the Spam Epidemic: Can You Legislate Spam Away?,
ABOUT.COM (May 16, 2004), at http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/emailsecurity/a/
aa051604.htm. (concluding, in April 2004, that 9.2% of global e-mails contained some form
of virus).
27. See Spam Zombie, supra note 22.
28. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 343.
29. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64
(1980).
30. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CO-OPERATION, BACKGROUND
PAPER FOR THE OECD WORKSHOP ON SPAM, at 14, at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/LinkTo/dsti-iccp(2003)10-final (Jan. 22, 2004).
31. This cost is estimated to be .0032 cents per message. See Edwards, supra note 24, at
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are borne by others. The extent of other forms of commercial advertising
that occurs is limited by the cost of the advertising. With e-mail, the cost is
higher on the recipients than on the advertisers, with an estimated margin
of $270 million for spammers versus an inflicted cost of $8-10 billion on
the rest of the world in 2002.32 Given this cost imbalance, there is no
effective economic limit on the amount of spain that can occur, other than
the limits of the ability of end-users to shoulder the costs.
Congress previously addressed the issue of cost-shifting in the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA").33 The TCPA
prohibited the sending of unsolicited advertisements via fax. A First
Amendment challenge to the Act failed in Destination Ventures v. FCC.4
The Ninth Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its authority by
restricting the ability of advertisers to shift the costs of advertising onto
consumers. The cost of an unsolicited fax advertisement was only between
three and forty cents per sheet, but the Court found that this was enough to
justify Congress' decision to regulate.35
While the cost shifting imposed by the present volume of spain
messages may seem trivial to many individual users, the continuous and
steady growth of the problem gives cause for concern. The spain problem
threatens to reach far beyond commercial messages. Mailing lists are
already inexpensive to obtain,36 and there is nothing to prevent the
possessor of a list from posting it to the Web. Every Internet user would be
empowered to speak and have the whole world listen. While most users
would show better judgment, a few would be sure to abuse it. Those who
have been on mailing lists where various persons have carried out their
discussions by using the reply-all option will appreciate the potential for
disaster if this were to occur with millions of people on the list (while most
users might realize that they were being quite obnoxious by doing this, a
listserv could make this act completely innocent and transparent). Multiply
this potential for mass-mailing abuse with the ability to send large video or
multimedia files and one can quickly see that e-mail could be destroyed as
an effective medium of communication when spam is carried to the
extreme. What is now just an annoyance could soon threaten to overflow
93.
32. Id. at 93-94.
33. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000).
34. Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
35. Id. at 56-57.
36. See Sam Vaknin, The Economics of Spam, ELECTRONIC BOOK WEB (July 23, 2002),
at http://12.108.175.91/ebookweb/discuss/msgReader$1533 (claiming that a list of ten
million e-mail addresses costs only 100 dollars).
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inboxes and clog the arteries of the Internet on a very large scale. As Sorkin
suggests, e-mail users could be pushed to adopt other means of electronic
communication.37
III. LEGAL HISTORY
The spam problem has spurred a steady stream of different responses.
Early attempts focused on common law remedies and self-regulation. As
these approaches failed to dissuade spammers, many private parties tried to
develop technical solutions. The mixed results of technical approaches led
states to craft legislation targeting spam. Most recently, the European
Union and United States Congress have begun to address the spam problem
through legislation. Because these legislative responses have been met with
limited success,38 private industry has turned its full attention to solving the
span problem through a number of competing responses.39
A. Common Law Remedies
In the absence of governing legislation, there have been a number of
cases where common law causes of action have been applied to strike back
at spammers. In Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions Inc.,4 a district
court found an ISP could claim trespass to chattels where a spammer had
sent unsolicited commercial e-mail, even after being advised that certain
recipients did not want to receive these messages.41 Trespass to chattels was
found "to include the unauthorized use of personal property."42
Compuserve successfully argued that it had been harmed by losing
customers who were upset by the amount of spam they were receiving and
that the high volume of unsolicited commercial e-mail was preventing
Compuserve's customers from having full access to the services they were
paying Compuserve to provide.43
Some courts have taken a more restrictive view of the applicability of
common law remedies. In Intel Corp. v. Hamidi," the Supreme Court of
California found that trespass to chattels should not encompass "electronic
37. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 338-39. The concern for the long-term viability of e-mail is
increasing. See, e.g., Metz, supra note 5.
38. Sinrod, supra note 5.
39. Paul Roberts, Competing Technologies Could Shake Up E-Mail, INFOWORLD (Mar.
1, 2004), at http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/03/01/HNcompeting-l.html.
40. 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
41. Id. at 1020-24.
42. Id. at 1020.
43. Id. at 1019, 1022-23.
44. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
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communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor
impairs its functioning."4 This holding raises serious questions about the
robustness of common law remedies as a means of blocking spammers.
Individual cases of spam will rarely cause any material damage or
impairment to recipient systems. The harm caused by spam is more a result
of aggregation. While a single, unwanted message may be a mere
annoyance, hundreds or even thousands of unwanted messages sent to an
individual can cripple e-mail as an effective medium of communication for
that user. Fortunately, the mixed success of common law responses to
spammers are becoming irrelevant in light of the increasing availability of
statutory remedies at both the state and federal level.
B. Legislative Responses
Governments around the world are recognizing the dangers posed by
spare. Numerous states have acted to proscribe spam. As of September
2004, thirty-four states have acted to restrict spain in various forms of
legislation.46 A number of European Union ("EU") directives have also
targeted spam .47 The EU E-Commerce Directive requires that "Member
States shall lay down in their legislation that unsolicited commercial
communication by electronic mail must be clearly and unequivocally
identifiable as such as soon as it is received by the recipient. '"48
Most recently, the United States passed the Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM
Act").49 The CAN-SPAM Act prohibits fraudulent mass e-mails.5° It also
specifically targets false or misleading transmission of information and
deceptive subject headings.5 It requires that opt-out requests be honored
and that the spammer be able to receive mail at his return address."2 The
CAN-SPAM Act calls for the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to
45. Id. at 300.
46. David Sorkin, State Laws, at http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html (last
revised Dec. 16, 2003).
47. Magee, supra note 2, at 362-73 (describing the EU Data Protection Directive,
Distance Selling Directive, Telecommunications Directive, E-Commerce Directive, and
Electronic Communications Privacy Directive).
48. Id. at 368 (citing Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Aspects
of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market,
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1).
49. CAN-SPAM Act 2003, supra note 4.





consider the creation of a national Do-Not-E-mail registry. 3 As a result of
the CAN-SPAM Act, many state anti-spain laws may be preempted. 4 In
the wake of the CAN-SPAM Act, the FTC has promulgated a rule requiring
that sexually explicit e-mails bear the heading "Sexually-explicit:" in their
subject line." The CAN-SPAM Act also solves the potential dormant
Commerce Clause challenges posed by state anti-spam regulation by
regulating spam at the federal level.56
As the recent wave of spam regulation demonstrates, the question
posed by spam is not whether spam should be regulated, but how it can be
regulated effectively. The problem has continued its steady growth and
managed to evade both technical and legal solutions.
C. First Amendment Concerns
The First Amendment will place constraints upon any attempt to
regulate spam. Legislators must be extremely careful as they decide
whether to regulate all unsolicited bulk e-mail or just all unsolicited
commercial e-mail. As decisions to filter messages move out of the hands
of government and into the hands of private parties, however, the First
Amendment becomes less of a factor. The right of one individual to speak
does not carry with it the right to make others listen. Nor does it include the
right to force private parties to facilitate an advertiser's speech.
Unsolicited commercial e-mails have been afforded little protection
under the First Amendment. In Compuserve,57  the private ISP
(Compuserve) made a successful trespass against chattels claim against
Cyber Promotions on the basis of Cyber Promotions' continued sending of
spam, even after receiving requests to cease and desist. 8 The Court held
that the legal measures taken by Compuserve to block spam did not violate
53. § 7708. The FTC has since abandoned this section because of concerns over
technical feasibility. See Grant Gross, FTC Declines Do-Not-Spam List, PC WORLD (June
15, 2004), at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,l 16536,00.asp.
54. § 7707. See also State Spare Laws, supra note 5.
55. Label for Email Messages Containing Sexually Oriented Material, 69 Fed. Reg.
21024 (Apr. 19, 2004) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 316), available
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/040413adultemailfinalrule.pdf. See also REUTERS, FTC:
Porn Spam Must be Labeled (Apr. 13, 2004), at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105_2-
5190959.html.
56. See generally Michael B. Edwards, A Call to Arms: Marching Orders for the North
Carolina Anti-Spam Statute, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 107-13 (2002) (applying the Pike test
to the North Carolina anti-spam statute).
57. Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
58. Id. at 1017.
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the First Amendment.59 As an ISP, Compuserve was a private actor, and the
sending of spam had been found to be a trespass against private property.
The First Amendment could not be applied to Compuserve as a private
actor or used to compel the appropriation of private property to deliver
Cyber Promotions' messages.' The Court's holding was limited to the
context of a private actor engaging in the filtering. The issues of anti-spam
legislation and government involvement in filtering remain contentious
issues.
Where commercial speech is regulated by a government entity, the
Central Hudson four-part test is applicable.6 As a prerequisite for First
Amendment protection, the speech must be lawful and not misleading. A
large quantity of spain fails to meet this prerequisite for First Amendment
protection. When spain does qualify as protected speech, there must be a
substantial governmental interest served by the regulation, and the
regulation must directly advance the governmental interest. Finally, if the
regulation is to be upheld, it must be narrowly tailored to the governmental
interest that it seeks to advance.62
The government has a compelling interest in regulating the subset of
•spain that is lawful and not misleading. Spam in all of its forms leads to a
shifting of costs from sender to receiver. Commercial cost shifting was
found to be compelling in Destination Ventures.63 The issue of greater
concern in crafting spam regulations is the need to tailor the regulation to
the substantial governmental interest at stake. Congress' decision to target
only unsolicited advertising was upheld in Destination Ventures.' The
regulation of all unsolicited bulk e-mail, instead of all unsolicited
commercial e-mail, must survive strict scrutiny. A broader attempt to
regulate non-commercial bulk e-mail would need to be narrowly tailored to
the need to protect minors from pornography, improve computer security,
and maintain the viability of e-mail as a means of personal and solicited
commercial communication.
59. Id. at 1025-26 (citing Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc. 948 F.Supp.
436 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
60. Id. at 1026.
61. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
62. Id. This tailoring requires the regulation to be no more extensive than necessary, but
it does not have to be the least restrictive means of regulation. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480 (1989).




Recent attempts to protect individuals from unwanted telemarketing
have underscored the difficulty in tailoring an interest in speech regulation
to a regulatory solution. The FTC recently attempted to create a national
Do-Not-Call Registry as part of a revision to the Telemarketing Sales
Rules.65 The revised rules imposed fines for telemarketers that called
numbers on the Do-Not-Call Registry "to induce the purchase of goods or
services."66 A federal district court struck down the revised rules on First
Amendment grounds.67 It held that unlike the circumstances in Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department,6" where the right to refuse certain
unwanted solicitations was upheld, the government had not enabled
consumers to choose which solicitations to block.69 Only commercial, and
not charitable, solicitations could be blocked. However, both were held to
be protected speech.7° Because it was not the individual that was making
the choice as to which calls to block, the court held that the revised rules
amounted to an unconstitutional governmental restraint on speech.71
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court
and upheld the constitutionality of the Do-Not-Call Registry. 72 The Tenth
Circuit was satisfied that individuals were making autonomous choices
similar to those in Rowan under the revised rules.73 It found that the
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech appeared to be
reasonable because commercial solicitations are more likely to result in
fraud,74 and have done more to invade individual privacy than non-
commercial solicitations.75 The Tenth Circuit's holding is quite significant
due to a provision in the CAN-SPAM Act that calls for the FTC to consider
the creation of a national "Do-Not-E-mail" registry.76 In light of the Tenth
Circuit's decision, a "Do-Not-E-mail" registry is also likely to withstand
65. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b) (2003).
66. Id. at § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).
67. Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Colo. 2003).
68. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
69. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
70. Id. at 1167.
71. Id. at 1168.
72. Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FCC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
2004 LEXIS 5564 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2004).
73. Id. at 1237-38.
74. Id. at 1237, 1240.
75. Id. at 1238-39 (stating that "the First Amendment does not require that the
government regulate all aspects of a problem before it can make progress on any front").
76. CAN-SPAM Act 2003, supra note 4, at §7708. The FTC has since responded that a
Do-Not-E-mail registry is not worth pursuing. See Grant Gross, FTC Declines Do-Not-Spam
List, PC WORLD, June 15, 2004, at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/
0,aid, 116536,00.asp.
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First Amendment scrutiny.
It is unlikely that any First Amendment challenge to the CAN-SPAM
Act will be successfully asserted. The CAN-SPAM Act does not even
attempt to proscribe unsolicited commercial or adult-oriented e-mails,
opting instead to only require spammers to honor opt-out requests. These
opt-out requests must be made separately for each unwanted solicitor and
are analogous to those upheld in Rowan.
The First Amendment question is most easily resolved when filtering
is performed by a private actor, namely the ISP or the intended spain
recipient. The ISP, when a private actor, is immune from First Amendment
attack." Advertisers are also unable to wield the First Amendment to
guarantee the right to have their messages heard by consumers. The First
Amendment does not compel consumers to view any unwanted
communication.78
The best regulatory framework for spam will be one that shifts
content-based filtering decisions into the hands of private parties. Attention
has increasingly turned to private industry to provide a solution to the spam
epidemic.
D. Industry's Response
A number of corporations are determined to defeat spam, and their
responses are growing increasingly complex. Initial responses to span have
focused on fighting it at the receiving end. Spam filters and blacklists are
the primary examples. The next approach is to fight span at its source.
Two general approaches to fighting spam at the source are increasing the
cost of sending spain and creating the ability to authenticate and identify
the senders.
Microsoft has suggested a couple of approaches aimed at reducing the
volume of spami by increasing the cost of sending e-mail.79 The first
approach is to charge postage for every e-mail message sent. 0 The second
approach is to increase the "cost" by requiring a payment in central
processing unit ("CPU") cycles, for example requiring a complex
computation before each message can be sent.81 Sending bulk e-mail would
become a much more time-consuming process.
77. See Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 1026 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
78. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
79. See generally Can E-Mail Survive, supra note 5.
80. Id. at 66.
81. Id. at 67.
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These cost-increasing approaches attempt to place commercial e-mail
on a more equal footing with other forms of solicitation, such as
telemarketing and direct mailings. In theory, the number of these types of
solicitations are limited by the costs imposed on the seller. For everyone
using e-mail, this approach has the unfortunate side effect of increasing
user costs. In particular, it increases the costs for anyone who wishes to
send bulk mail, regardless of whether it is commercial or solicited. It is also
unclear whether increasing the costs associated with sending spam will
really reduce spam to a more acceptable level. The recent proliferation of
do-not-call lists suggests that even relatively costly forms of advertising
can rise to the level of an unwanted intrusion. Finally, simply increasing
the costs of sending e-mail does not necessarily empower more effective
spam regulation. Microsoft has recently backed away from this approach. 2
Rather than increasing the cost of sending e-mail, another approach is
to attempt to authenticate the legitimacy of the sender's address before
allowing messages to be sent.83 Yahoo has proposed a system called
"DomainKeys" that will use digital signatures and the public key
infrastructure to verify that a message actually was sent by the domain
listed in the "From:" field (for example, in joeuser@aol.com, "aol.com" is
the domain).84 Another system with the same goal is the Sender Policy
Framework ("SPF").8 s SPF attempts to match the Internet Protocol ("IP")
address listed as the source of an e-mail with the IP addresses actually used
to send e-mail from that domain. 6 This approach is primarily effective
against the use of open relays and spoofed (or forged) sender addresses.
SPF is more efficient than other systems relying on public key
cryptography, but also needs to rely on blackhole lists to be really
effective.87 Finally, Microsoft has proposed "Caller-ID for Email,"8 an
82. See, e.g., Kevin Murphy, Gates Backs Away from Postage Stamps Idea in Spain
Vision, COMPUTER Bus. REV., June 29, 2004, at http://www.computerbusinessreview.coml
researchcentres/59984863230a I 18e80256ec20032dda4.
83. Hiawatha Bray, Tech Experts Say Spammers Are on the Run, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
26, 2004, at C3, available at http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2004/01/
26/tech experts-say-spammers are on the run/ [hereinafter Spammers Are on the Run].
84. Alex Salkever, Yahoo's Risky Antispam Gambit, Bus. WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 13,
2004), at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2004/tc20040113-3442
tc047.htm.
85. SENDER POLICY FRAMEWORK, What is SPF?, at http://spf.pobox.coml
howworks.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (providing a general overview of SPF).
86. Wong & Lentczner, SENDER POLICY FRAMEWORK, A Convention to Describe Hosts
Authorized to Send SMTP Traffic (Feb. 2003), at 3, at http://spf.pobox.com/draft-
mengwong-spf-00.txt (Internet draft, expiration date July, 2004).
87. See generally SENDER POLICY FRAMEWORK, Executive Summary, at
http://spf.pobox.com/execsumm.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
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authentication-based solution that was recently merged with SPF in a new
standard called "Sender ID."89 None of these authentication-based solutions
are promising to identify the sender of a message. Instead, they try to make
sure that a message has been sent from the domain from which it claims to
have been sent.
DomainKeys and Sender ID both promise to allow message recipients
to verify that the sender of a message has sent the message from his own
domain.9" They do not actually guarantee that the identity or physical
location of the sender is known. The idea is that bulk messages sent by
persons who do not use their own domain (i.e., johndoe@yahoo.com
sending a message through hotmail.com) will be easier to spot and filter.
Those who simply send spam from their own domain can be traced back to
their ISP, and the ISP can either deal with them appropriately or be
blacklisted.9 This is a purely technical solution. It is also a step in the right
direction, but stops short of reaching its full potential.
DomainKeys and Sender ID both fail to address an array of problems
posed by spam and create a number of legal concerns. Spammers can
continue to create accounts for one-time use and quickly dispose of them.
They can still hack into innocent third-party computers and use them for
sending spam through the ISP of the compromised machine (spam
zombies). Unsolicited and solicited messages will not be differentiated any
more easily. A message bearing a valid "From:" address could be protected
political speech, pornography, a phishing scam," or any other category of
88. See, e.g., MICROSOFT CORP., Caller ID for E-Mail Technical Specification, at
http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam-senderid.mspx (last visited Sept. 1
2004); Michael Singer, Microsoft Proposes Caller IDfor E-mail, INTERNET NEWS (Feb. 25,
2004), at http://www.intemetnews.comlent-news/article.php/3 317611.
89. See Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Sender ID Specification Submitted to Standards
Body for Consideration (June 24, 2004), at http://www.microsoft.comlpresspass/press/
2004/jun04/06-24SIDSpecIETFPR.asp. Microsoft and the Internet Engineering Task Force
have since had a falling out over Microsoft's license terms and intellectual property claims.
See Reed Stevenson, E-Mail ID Plan Rejected, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2004), at
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=581 &e= I &u=/nm/20040914/tcnm/tec
h_microsoft-securitydc.
90. See Yahoo! Anti-Spam Resource Center: Domain Keys, at
http://antispam.yahoo.com/domainkeys (last visited Oct. 5, 2004); Sender ID Framework at
a Glance, at http://www.microsoft.comlmscorp/twc/privacy/spam-senderid.mspx (Sept. 30,
2004).
91. See Yahoo! Anti-Spam Resource Center: Domain Keys, at
http://antispam.yahoo.comdomainkeys (last visited Oct, 5, 2004).
92. See Russell Kay, Phishing, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 19, 2004, at 44 ("Phishing is a
technique used to gain personal information for purposes of identity theft, using fraudulent
e-mail messages that appear to come from legitimate businesses. These authentic-looking
messages are designed to fool recipients into divulging personal data such as account
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content. ISPs may still refuse to provide or be unable to provide the identity
of the sender. Senders from blacklisted domains will likely have messages
filtered, not for their own bad behavior, but because their ISP has not dealt
effectively with spammers. ISPs can have their domains blacklisted without
any chance to defend themselves or clear their names.
Although these technical responses to spam are largely fragmented,
computer industry leaders have recently begun cooperating to work toward
a common solution to span. Industry leaders, including Microsoft,
America Online, and Yahoo!, have joined to form the Anti-Spam Technical
Alliance ("ASTA"). 3 The group recently released a "Technology and
Policy Proposal."94 The alliance calls for an authentication-based
framework for reducing spam, but the specific technology to be adopted
has not been decided. The alliance fails to demonstrate much concern for
First Amendment freedoms or the need to exist as part of a legislative
framework. The authentication-based solutions that have been proposed fail
to protect anonymous speech.95 They also fail to go the last mile by
providing the ability to associate an electronic address with a real person.
Without identifying the sender, legal enforcement is unrealistic.
Authentication-based solutions in their currently proposed form do not
appear likely to solve the spai problem. However, an authentication-based
architecture could be extended to enable a more effective regulatory




Much of the difficulty in regulating spain is derived from the largely
unregulable nature of the Internet in its present form. On the technical
level, the Internet allows for great anonymity as to both identity and
location. Its overwhelming scale and decentralized architecture make
effective monitoring unfeasible. From a legal perspective, the Internet does
not fall exclusively within any jurisdiction. Effective regulation of the
Internet in its current form is impossible due to the uncertainty as to
numbers and passwords, credit card numbers and Social Security numbers.").
93. Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Anti-Spam Technical Alliance Publishes
Recommendations to Help Stop Spam (June 22, 2004), at http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/press/2004/Jun04/06-22ASTAPR.asp.
94. Id.
95. Anonymous speech has been afforded substantial First Amendment protection. See
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
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location, jurisdiction, and identity. Yet, the Internet is not immutable. As
Lessig argues,
Cyberspace has no nature; it has no particular architecture that cannot
be changed. Its architecture is a function of its.., code. This code can
change, either because it evolves in a different way, or because
government or business pushes it to evolve in a particular way. And
while particular versions of cyberspace do resist effective regulation, it
does not follow that every version of cyberspace does so as well. 6
When the code of the Internet is changed to increase regulability,
there will be inevitable trade-offs. Within the realm of spain regulation, as
identity becomes more readily ascertainable, then some privacy is
sacrificed. As the content of e-mail is labeled and categorized, the
possibility of censorship emerges. Once location is easily determinable,
every government with an interest in Internet regulation becomes
empowered to regulate the content of the Internet in some way. An
architectural change for one particular purpose may be leveraged to
accomplish regulation beyond that particular purpose.9" For this reason, it is
necessary to carefully scrutinize every architectural change designed to
increase the regulability of the Internet to ascertain its full ramifications.
Legislative attempts to regulate spain must also be scrutinized
carefully for unwanted effects. Spam legislation threatens to legitimize
spam by providing safe harbor for those who engage in it.98 Most unwanted
span is perpetuated by a small number of disrepitable but determined
persons. While having already experienced exponential growth, the
problem could be exacerbated if more reputable businesses began
exploiting the e-mail medium more aggressively. Additionally, national
regulatory efforts such as the CAN-SPAM Act can preempt stricter state
laws. While anti-spam legislation is clearly needed to remedy the market
breakdown that has allowed the spain problem to spin out of control, we
must be cautious in implementing statutorily imposed architectural
changes. Architectural changes aimed at improving Internet regulability
may later be wielded to undermine the freedoms embodied by the Internet
of today. It is with a precautionary tone that this Note begins to outline the
architecture of a system that enables more effective spam regulation.
B. A Different Approach
The proposed architectural changes are grounded in the Online
96. Lessig, supra note 1, at 506.
97. Id. at 519.
98. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 382-83.
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community's common disdain for spam. In real space, societal norms are
able to shape behavior. In cyberspace, norms do not possess the same
ability to shape individual behavior.99 The spammer does not come face-to-
face with his angry audience. Peer pressure loses its force. No matter how
large the spam problem becomes and how upset its recipients are, the
spammers are not effectively dissuaded. Rather than changing the
Internet's architecture to mandate an end to spam, architectural changes can
be implemented that will have the effect of establishing societal norms for
e-mail. Messages that deviate from these norms become easier to filter.
Laws should be passed to stimulate the creation of these norms, thereby
using the law as a catalyst for a technical solution.
1. Technical Overview
As a preliminary step, a general technical approach to dealing with
the spam problem must be adopted. This Note argues for leveraging an
authentication-based framework to enable more effective spain regulation.
This approach is manifested in a number of systems being developed by
private industry,"° and inevitably involves a means of authenticating either
the sender or the domain from which a message is sent. Authentication can
be costly to implement, 10' but the remainder of this Note argues that an
authentication-based system is more desirable as a matter of law and
policy. The authentication-based architecture proposed by this Note
attempts to meld the tools provided by both law and technology. While
grounded in a technological framework, this architecture utilizes a legal
regime that enables it to overcome the obstacles to reducing spam that a
solely technical solution would be unable to achieve.
This Note argues for an architectural system built around the ability to
digitally sign' ° and authenticate e-mail using public key cryptography.0 3
99. See generally Lessig, supra note 1, at 503-05 (discussing why cyberspace creates
challenges not encountered in real space).
100. Spammers Are on the Run, supra note 85.
101. Authentication requires a computational overhead for every message handled. See
generally SearchSecurity.Com, DomainKeys, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/
gDefinition/0,294236,sid26_gci944600,00.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
102. In technical terms, a digital signature "is a special case of a message integrity code,
where the code can have been generated only by one participant." LARRY L. PETERSON &
BRUCE S. DAVIE, COMPUTER NETWORKS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 589 (2d ed. 2000).
103. Digital signatures and public key cryptography work as follows: The individual
signing the message will have two keys (very large prime numbers), a private and a public
key. The recipient must know the sender's public key, but not the private key. A message
(in this case, a signature) is encrypted by the sending party using his private key. The
recipient receives the encrypted message and is able to decode it into a readable signature
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In basic terms, a sender of a bulk message will digitally sign his message
using his private key. The recipient of his message will obtain the sender's
public key from a certification authority"° (to be administered by a federal
agency) and use it to verify the authenticity of the signature. By signing a
message, the sender will indicate his assent to a regulatory code of conduct
for signed bulk e-mail. A similar system for authenticating signatures is
employed by the Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP") system for securing e-
mail.105
The system described up to this point uses an authentication-based
framework similar to those being proposed by private industry. In
particular, DomainKeys proposes utilizing the public key infrastructure to
authenticate the source of messages by using digital signatures. However,
DomainKeys does not promise to do much more than enable users to
determine the true source e-mail address and domain. It does not establish
the actual identity of a message sender. This Note proposes extending this
architecture to integrate legal enforcement and protections, distinguish
between solicited and unsolicited messages, and fully protect free speech.
2. Extending the Authentication-Based Framework
The public key infrastructure can be extended to generate not only
signed e-mail messages, but also to generate opt-in and opt-out signatures.
Opt-in requests will be generated by individuals who create a signed
request using their private key, either by Web or e-mail. The signed
requests will be sent to the specified bulk mailer, who will be able to verify
the signature with the certificate authority and keep the signed request as
proof of the opt-in request. This process can and should be automated by e-
mail clients wishing to incorporate this filtering technology. The opt-out
process can be similarly automated. Individuals can send a signed request
using the sender's public key. Id. at 570, 589.
104. A certification authority is "an administrative entity that is in the business of issuing
certificates." Id. at 591. The certificates in this instance are digitally signed documents
originating from the governing agency that tell one individual the public key of another
individual. Id.
105. PGP runs in conjunction with an e-mail program to enable users to sign and encrypt
their messages. The Author proposes a method for signing documents which is similar, but
does not suggest adopting message encryption as part of the proposed system. Encryption,
quite interestingly, has the effect of making things much more difficult for both spam filters
and spammers. The Author does not suggest a system including PGP message encryption
because message encryption poses substantial challenges to scalability. This Author also
does not intend to adopt PGP's decentralized certification structure, and instead proposes a
more standard hierarchical structure built around government administered certification
authorities. Id. at 599, 601. For background information, please see The International PGP
Home Page at http://www.pgpi.org.
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using their private key. An automated, signed response must be sent back
by the bulk mailer. This response serves as proof that the opt-out request
has been received. If the automated response is not received from the bulk
mailer, the individual's e-mail program should send an automated
complaint to agency servers. The signed requests are important because
they can be automatically retained to provide documentary evidence to
each party of its compliance or non-compliance with agency regulations. A
signature can also require the entry of a password, an additional step that
would make the use of spam zombies to create signed messages
considerably more difficult.
At the root of the Author's architectural model will be a governmental
agency, possibly the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") or
another organization by delegation." 6 This agency will be required to
formulate and enforce spam regulations; it will also need to administer an
authentication system. This administration process will involve governing
the certification authority and facilitating the issuance of public and private
keys.
The middle tier of the Author's model includes ISPs and software
developers. ISPs will need to be responsible for the actual issuance of
public and private keys to account holders. Keys should only be issued to
account holders with valid mailing addresses. ISPs are more capable than
government agencies of obtaining valid names and addresses for their own
account holders as a result of ISPs' existing financial relationships with
their customers. From an enforcement perspective, valid identification and
contact information is necessary. From an administrative perspective, this
information needs to be obtained accurately, quickly, and inexpensively.
Only the ISPs are in a position to do this because they should already have
access to this information for account holders. The free Web-based e-mail
accounts that have proliferated in recent years would not be able to send
signed messages under this system.
Software developers will need to implement the technical aspects of
this regulatory model. Most major e-mail programs already attempt to
handle some spam filtering. The features the Author has suggested can be
implemented into existing e-mail programs. Protocols for implementing
this architecture should be promulgated by a federal agency in conjunction
with private industry. The opt-in and opt-out processes can be automated
by e-mail clients and Web browsers to make the implementation painless
for users. It is imperative that these opt-in and opt-out requests must be
106. The FCC is suggested, instead of the FTC, because the proposed system does not
distinguish between commercial and non-commercial e-mail.
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integrated into the user's software, rather than relying on the opt-out links
of today that are created solely by the sender of a bulk message. As part of
the opt-in process, the user's software must first verify the legitimacy of the
bulk mailer's key and ensure that it has not been revoked. Because this
proposed architecture builds on top of existing technology, any software
developer should be capable of implementing the new protocols.
The lower tier of the proposed model includes both the average e-mail
user and bulk mailers. Both types of individuals will need public-private
key pairs in order to be included in the system. In fact, the success of this
architecture is heavily dependent upon the network effects that will result
from its broad adoption by users. It is only after broad user adoption that a
substantial number of bulk mailers will feel the need to participate.
3. Proposed Regulatory Framework
This proposed regulatory framework is in and of itself an opt-in
approach. Individual e-mail users, spammers, and ISPs will be free to
determine whether they wish to participate. The cost to enroll in this
regulatory program must be free. To require a payment could have the
effect of placing a prior restraint on speech. Enrollment would entail a
voluntary agreement to abide by agency regulations whenever sending
digitally signed bulk messages. The purpose behind creating a voluntary
regulatory system is not to simply abolish spam, but to make e-mail
filtering easier for those who want to make themselves relatively immune
from spam. As more people enroll in the program, reputable spammers will
have little choice but to enroll if they wish to avoid having their messages
filtered. The eventual success of the system ultimately depends on a large
number of e-mail users and a few ISPs participating. It is from this
foundation that societal norms for e-mail behavior may begin to take effect.
Spam filters should be able to identify most bulk messages and, from
that point, distinguishing between signed and unsigned messages should be
relatively easy. Individuals will have the option to have all unsigned bulk
messages filtered. In addition, sparnmers will have to indicate whether their
signed messages are solicited or not. Once again, users will have the ability
to have the unsolicited messages filtered if they wish. The filtering will
ideally be performed by 1SPs, although any intermediary that relays a
message will be capable of verifying the authenticity of a signature and
dropping messages found to have forged signatures or revoked licenses.
Individuals will be able to set their account preferences for filtering through
their ISP's software. The ISPs are in turn free to allow very fine-grained
filtering options or none at all. Under ideal circumstances, ISPs will offer a
wide range of filtering options. Some will take a very aggressive stance
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towards spam, and others will choose not to participate in the regulatory
program at all (and their account holders will have to turn to another
provider if they want to participate).
All e-mail users, whether participants in this regulatory framework or
not, must be free to send unsigned bulk messages. Their messages risk
being filtered before reaching some users, but this filtering will be the
result of individual preferences and not government censorship. Users will
still be able to send anonymous messages in bulk. They can retain their
anonymity and full rights of speech. It is only when signing a message
using the government issued key that they must abide by the government
regulations. Those who violate regulations for signed bulk messages will be
subject to agency enforcement and adjudication.
4. Defining "Bulk"
A complicated prerequisite for regulating all bulk e-mail is to define
"bulk." By stipulating a certain threshold for a message being classified as
bulk, the door is effectively opened to find ways to avoid crossing the
threshold while still sending the same volume of messages. For example, if
the definition of bulk e-mail is an e-mail message addressed to 1,000 or
more e-mail recipients, then the simple way to circumvent the definition is
to send multiple messages with 999 recipients each. An alternative
definitional approach is to define bulk in terms of a message sending rate,
such as sending messages to 5,000 addresses during a twenty-four hour
period. This approach is better in principle, but suffers from technical
limitations. It places a substantial burden on participating ISPs to expect
them to maintain complicated logs of all received e-mails during a
specified time period.
A more effective approach is to allow individual users or ISPs to
define bulk. Once again users could set individual preferences for a
threshold number of recipients to be classified as bulk. ISPs could also
participate by factoring in the total number of messages they have been
receiving from a certain e-mail or IP address. By avoiding a regulatory
threshold for bulk mail, it becomes more difficult to circumvent that
threshold.
5. Enforcement Procedures and Penalties
Admittedly, placing spam regulation enforcement power in the hands
of a U.S. federal agency may solve interstate enforcement issues, but does
nothing to solve international jurisdictional issues. For this reason, the
primary means of enforcement must be technical. Repeated violations of
regulations while sending signed messages will result in license (key)
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revocation. When ISPs or other intermediaries attempt to verify the validity
of a signature, they will receive a message indicating that the license has
been revoked. Messages should then be automatically dropped.
6. Global Implementation
The system's global adoption will initially depend on allowing
individuals to obtain a bulk e-mail license regardless of nationality. If the
system gains popularity over the long run, it can be expanded to
incorporate other nations' administrative agencies. The architectural root
will necessarily remain in the United States to ensure that a consistent set
of regulations remains in place, but the system can be expanded to
incorporate numerous nations serving as certification authorities. As more
nations begin to participate, international enforcement will expand from
solely technical enforcement to encompass varying means of legal
enforcement.
C. Scrutiny of Proposed Architecture
Any proposal to regulate spain should be subjected to stringent
technical and legal scrutiny. The proposed architecture should be
scrutinized according to a range of legal and technical considerations.
Legal criteria should include narrow tailoring to spam, privacy
preservation, transparency, the functionality of opt-out mechanisms,
enforceability, and cost-effectiveness. These criteria are appropriate
considerations for both the proposed architecture and other privately
developed solutions.
1. Narrowly Tailored to Spam
Architectural changes should be no greater than required to enable
more effective spam regulation. The fundamental problem in narrowly
tailoring a system to spain is the difficulty in actually defining spam.
Different people may have different ideas as to what types of messages
they deem to be spam, and the differing views of spai are demonstrated by
the different approaches that are being developed to stop spam. The
authentication-based frameworks that have been proposed by industry may
be effective in preventing spammers from using false return addresses and
open relays, but this fails to reach a large amount of spam. For example,
these solutions do nothing to address the spammer who uses a valid return
address but refuses to honor opt-out requests. It also fails to slow down the
use of spam zombies. The authentication-based solutions such as SPF will
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also depend on the blacklisting of ISPs that fail to shut down spammers
operating from their domain, °7 but as previously mentioned, this will result
in e-mail being blocked from both the spammer and other innocent
individuals using the same ISP. On the other hand, a postage-based
approach directed at increasing the cost of sending bulk e-mail is both
over- and underinclusive. It discriminates against solicited bulk e-mail and
fails to deter messages sent through spam zombies. When a spammer takes
advantage of a spam zombie, he does not end up paying the postage bill.
Both of these approaches benefit from being content neutral, but fail to
distinguish between solicited and unsolicited messages.
The system proposed by this Note easily complies with any narrow
tailoring requirement. No filtering is mandated by the government. Both
message senders and receivers are free to participate or abstain as they
desire. The only classifications of messages imposed on those who
participate is between unsolicited and solicited messages. Any decision to
refuse unsolicited messages is made solely by message recipients. Instead
of attempting to regulate the content of messages, this system simply
provides e-mail users and ISPs with one key piece of information about
messages that cannot otherwise be reliably obtained - namely, whether a
message is unsolicited or not.
By differentiating between solicited and unsolicited messages, e-
mail's potential as a means of mass communication is preserved. A system
that solely targets bulk e-mail threatens to eliminate one of e-mail's
greatest strengths: the ability to inexpensively and rapidly communicate
with large numbers of people. Some individuals may wish to receive all
forms of unsolicited bulk messages. The proposed architecture places the
decision of whether to receive unsolicited messages squarely in the hands
of e-mail recipients.
2. Privacy Preserving
An inevitable result of increasing Internet regulability by utilizing an
authentication-based approach is to decrease privacy. Once senders are
more easily traced and identified, privacy in one form has been lost. On the
other hand, as users gain more control over what messages they receive,
another form of privacy is enhanced. As a result, these two concerns must
be balanced.
The proposed system does lead to the loss of some privacy. Signed
messages are by their very nature not anonymous. This loss in privacy is
107. See generally SENDER POLICY FRAMEWORK, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://spf.pobox.com/faq.html#churn (last visited Sept. 2, 2004).
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mitigated by both the optional nature of the system and the fact that only
the sending of signed bulk messages is affected. Messages, even bulk
messages, are not required to be signed. Unsigned messages simply have a
greater probability of being filtered. The intent of the system is to motivate
most senders of bulk e-mail to sign their messages, but the lack of a
requirement that messages be signed is constitutionally significant.1"8
Political speech, protest speech, and the like can still be sent anonymously.
None of it is required to be filtered by law.
This is not to suggest that the simple preservation of the ability to
send anonymous messages in bulk eliminates any concerns about lost
privacy. By having a government-administered certificate authority, "big
brother" will be able to connect signed messages with a name and address.
Those who consider this to be an unacceptable sacrifice of privacy will be
left to send unsigned messages or rely on other technical means such as
PGP. Ultimately, this privacy trade-off is a necessary one. Without the
ability to associate a signature with a name and address, there would be
little hope of legal enforcement for the regulatory scheme.
Other aspects of the system are quite successful in preserving privacy,
particularly the privacy of e-mail recipients. Users can filter unsolicited
messages without ever having to indicate to their ISPs or a governmental
authority which senders' messages they wish to solicit. The indication of
whether a message is solicited is made by the sender, and the mechanisms
of the opt-in system enable the sender to be held accountable for his
affirmation. The threat of ISPs attempting to retain this information and use
it for data-mining purposes remains. This threat should be dealt with by
appropriate legislation prohibiting the retention of any solicitation
information for any longer than is necessary to deliver a message.
3. Transparency
Giving users control over their inboxes requires that they know what
types of messages are, and more importantly, what types of messages are
not reaching their inboxes. A centralized filtering system that either relays
or drops messages based upon the judgments of an undisclosed filtering
algorithm undermines transparency. Blacklists are particularly vulnerable
to claims of a lack of transparency."° IP addresses can be added to the
108. Anonymous speech has been afforded strong First Amendment protection. See
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (stating that "the interest in
having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any
public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry").
109. Sorkin, supra note 7, at 356.
[Vol. 57
SPAM REGULATION
blacklists according to an unknown set of criteria, without concern for
whether particular users may wish to receive messages from that address.
The criteria for accepting or refusing e-mails should be user-controlled.
The proposed system enables more transparency by placing virtually
all filtering decisions in the hands of intended message recipients.
Blacklists and filters tend to operate under criteria unknown to users. By
allowing users to set separate rules for unsigned bulk messages, unsolicited
bulk messages, and solicited bulk messages, the end-to-end architecture of
the Internet is maintained' and the transparency of the system is
maximized.
Placing the system under administrative agency control guarantees
greater legal and procedural transparency. Parties will enjoy the protections
of the Administrative Procedures Act and due process when disputes over
regulatory compliance arise. Unlike vigilante systems such as blacklists,
parties will have notice of sanctions they face and will be given an
opportunity to exonerate themselves.
4. A Functional Opt-out System
Spam messages have often provided an opt-out mechanism. Just as
often these mechanisms have been non-functional or simply used to
validate that an address is active."' Sometimes the system fails because
return addresses have been spoofed. Often, it simply is not worth the
trouble for spammers to remove names. If a message is sent to 5 million
people, and 1 million reply with requests to be removed from the list, the
time required to comply is too great if the process is not automated. A
regulatory system needs to provide a standardized removal protocol that
can be integrated into e-mail clients to provide immediate and verifiable
removal.
Many would like to forego the burden of opting out by adopting a
universal opt-in approach. The opt-in versus opt-out debate has proven to
be particularly contentious in the European Union." 2 Some view this as a
110. End-to-end architecture refers to keeping the intelligence of the network toward the
endpoints at the application level. The middle portions of the network should be simple and
predictable to allow for a greater range of uses. This is because "complexity is the bane of
scalability." Zittrain, supra note 8, at 686. The end-to-end architecture of the Internet is best
preserved when filtering decisions are being made not by intermediaries, but rather by the
intended recipients.
111. SCHWARTZ & GARFINKEL, supra note 12, at 72-74; Sorkin, supra note 7, at 352-54;
Nasaw, supra note 5, at D2.
112. Magee, supra note 2, at 363.
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choice between being an advocate for or an opponent of e-commerce." 3
The CAN-SPAM Act did not mandate the opt-in approach, but did call for
the FTC to investigate the possibility of creating a universal opt-out choice
(Do-Not-E-mail List)." 4 Rather than explicitly choosing one approach or
the other, the Author's approach aims to achieve the universal opt-out
functionality (refusing all bulk e-mail) while still allowing a more refined
opt-in or opt-out approach for those who prefer more fine-tuned control
over the messages they receive.
This system's ability to handle opt-in and opt-out requests is one of its
key strengths. It is fully automated and designed to protect both the
message sender and recipient. Senders are able to prove when their
messages were solicited, and recipients are able to provide proof that they
have opted-out and that their request was received. This enables more
efficient enforcement.
5. Enforceability
The lack of a legal remedy against those who perpetuate the spain
problem is not the reason the spam problem has grown unchecked.
Examples of legal remedies include the implementation of state anti-spam
laws, the application of common law remedies, 115 and efforts to regulate
spam undtertaken .by both the United States and the European Union.
While the jurisdictional issues and the technical difficulty in identifying
spammers have contributed to the failure, the high cost of enforcement
relative to small damages in individual cases of spain have made spam
even more difficult to control. Legal enforcement must be quick and
efficient, and private lawsuits should not be exclusively relied upon.
Administrative enforcement is more desirable both from the standpoint of
cost and efficiency, as well as the ability to bring technical resources to
bear in tracking down spammers. The proposed system utilizes both
technical and legal means of enforcement. The technical enforcement will
involve revoking the license (keys) of those who violate the regulations for
sending signed messages. Legal enforcement will include both procedural
safeguards for those accused of violations and damages for those found to
have committed violations. The technical enforcement should be very
effective. Anyone who participates in the system is subject to technical
113. Id. at 363-64.
114. The FTC ultimately advised against the creation of a Do-Not-E-mail List. See
Grant Gross, FTC Declines Do-Not-Spain List, PC World (June 15, 2004) at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/O,aid, I16536,00.asp.
115. Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (discussing trespass to chattels).
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enforcement-jurisdiction is irrelevant. In contrast, only those in the United
States or other participating nations will be subject to legal enforcement as
a practical matter.
Technical enforcement should be adequate to maintain the proper
functioning of the system. It will have the effect of removing violators from
the system, but of course this does not prevent violators from sending
spain. Violators will still be able to keep sending unsigned spam, or may
try to register for another license. In realistic terms, solely relying on
technical enforcement should reduce the amount of e-mail reaching
participants' inboxes, but it does not necessarily reduce the amount of spam
being sent. Legal enforcement is more likely to dissuade spammers.
Ideally, the risks of legal enforcement will begin to outweigh the financial
benefits of spamming.
6. Cost-Effectiveness
Elaborate systems for regulating span quickly become very
expensive. The burden imposed should be outweighed by the harm that
would be caused by the unrestricted flow of spam over the Internet. In
evaluating cost-effectiveness, the total cost of spai must be considered.
Such costs include: payment for spam-filtering services and software, legal
actions against spammers, and the social costs associated with spam, such
as unsolicited pornography sent to minors.
The proposed system imposes high financial and technical costs. It
requires governmental administration and enforcement. It asks ISPs and
software developers to expand the functionality of their products and
services. Nevertheless, these financial costs are justified by the increasing
costs inflicted by unwanted spam. One technical cost imposed by the
proposed system is that it does not claim to be able to stop the sending of
spam. It instead focuses on enabling e-mail users to avoid ever receiving
the unwanted spam messages. Spam can still be sent and passed across the
Internet, all the way to the recipient ISP before finally being dropped by the
ISP on the basis of a recipient's e-mail receiving preferences. Only in the
limited circumstance where a signature is forged can a message bedropped
by the sending e-mail server or an intermediary before it consumes
bandwidth and storage space at the receiving end. This system does take
some steps to minimize its technical costs. Most significantly, only signed
and bulk messages will be affected by the changes. Unsigned messages
may be treated just as they were before, although ISPs may begin to
presumptively filter unsigned, bulk messages. Most personal messages will
likely not be signed and have no need to be signed.
The only way to avoid imposing these technical costs is to place prior
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restraints on the senders of spam. Examples of prior restraints include
legislation prohibiting the practice and requiring postage for the sending of
e-mail. Recent experience suggests that legislative restrictions are
ineffective. Requiring postage would be effective in reducing bulk mail
generally, because it does not distinguish between solicited and unsolicited
messages, or even commercial and non-commercial messages. The
disadvantage to requiring postage for e-mail is that it will discourage all
attempts to send bulk e-mail. However, some bulk e-mail may be socially
desirable. The postage approach appears to be overbroad in its impact
(socially, even if not legally).
D. Avoiding the Pitfalls of ICANN
The suggested approach places control largely in the hands of a
federal administrative agency. This approach leads to increased
transparency, efficient administrative adjudication, and greater public
accountability. However, this approach also does its share to complicate the
solution. A privatized solution, perhaps administered by the Anti-Spam
Technical Alliance, could largely bypass First Amendment scrutiny.
Private arbitration could ultimately be much less expensive than that
required by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). An alternative to
the agency-administered approach would be a privatized model in the form
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Number ("ICANN").
ICANN is a private, nonprofit corporation that was created to
administer the Internet's Domain Name System ("DNS"). The DNS system
was created with grants from the United States military and National
Science Foundation." 6 As international concern grew over leaving DNS
exclusively in the hands of the United States, ICANN was formed for the
express purpose of managing DNS." 7 ICANN's prominence as a type of
private government overseeing the Internet has been the subject of much
criticism.18 Critics argue that ICANN has been impermissibly delegated
administrative power to make policy without having to conform to the
requirements of the Constitution and APA.19
Even if it is assumed that ICANN is solely a private organization, as
some have argued, and not in any form a state actor, it then would be
116. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 21-22 (2000).
117. Id.at23-24.
118. See, e.g., Id.; A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2003). But see Edward Brunet, Defending Commerce's Contract
Delegation of Power to ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1 (2002).
119. Froomkin, supra note 116, at 33-34.
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subject to antitrust regulation. 2 ' ICANN has been permitted to operate as a
monopoly. Once viewed as a monopoly, ICANN's mandatory dispute
resolution policies and treatment of potential competitors becomes
problematic.'2 ' ICANN has recently been targeted in an antitrust lawsuit
filed by Verisign.' 22 ICANN's future legitimacy remains in doubt due to
widespread criticism and legal attack. The Internet's governing bodies of
the future will need broad multinational support to obtain longevity and
true legitimacy. At present, an agency-administered approach appears to be
a safer solution than a privatized model.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal and technical responses to spam, working individually, have
been ineffective in solving the problem. A more effective response will
require combining legal and technological tools. Technology can enable
more effective law enforcement by improving the ability of e-mail users to
reliably identify message senders. Enforcement becomes possible.
Technology can also be used to protect both e-mail recipients and senders
by providing documentation of each party's compliance with regulations.
The law can also work to make technological solutions more effective. By
prosecuting those who break laws in the course of sending spam, spammers
are more strongly dissuaded than they ever could be by filtering or other
technological measures. When law and technology are each utilized with
the goal of making the other part of the solution more effective, the whole
becomes greater than the sum of its parts.
This Note has suggested a possible architecture for combining
technological and legal means to reach a more effective result. Many
details have been omitted and would need to be more fully developed for
the system to be implemented. The purpose of this Note has not been to
develop a perfect solution, rather it has been to demonstrate that the spain
problem is too large and complex to be effectively solved by either the
legal or technical communities acting alone. Architectural changes must be
grounded in a solid legal and policy framework. Laws must be drafted not
with the purpose of ending spam, but rather with the purpose of enabling
technological solutions and providing for their enforcement.
In the realm of spam, it is the widespread disdain for spain that should
be leveraged to attack the problem. There is no need to mandate an end to
120. Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 118, at 3.
121. Id. at 5.
122. Nick Wingfield, VeriSign Files Antitrust Suit Against Web-Address Overseer,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2004, at A3.
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spain when most consumers and commercial entities would voluntarily
adhere to a set of spam regulations. The network effects of such a
collaboration can ultimately be more effective than a purely legislative
solution. As a critical mass of e-mail users voluntarily adhere to a
regulatory framework, those who do not adhere become easier to identify.
Spanmers will stand out from the crowd and be more easily filtered. Law
and technology can combine to make this collaboration between consumers
and commercial entities possible.
Any attempt to combine legal and technical approaches to spain is
presently inhibited by the abundance of competing technological and legal
regimes that deal with spam. An architectural change to e-mail will require
standardization. At present, there is no agreement for a new standard,
although private cooperation is increasing. The involvement of a federal
agency in adopting a standard could improve the likelihood of a standard
being agreed upon, as well as legitimize its adoption. From that point, the
door would be opened to broader international adoption and a cooperative
technical and legal approach to reducing spam. Whether such cooperation
will be achieved remains to be seen. The first step is for the legal and
technical communities to initiate an open dialogue on how to develop their
solutions with the needs and abilities of the other community in mind.
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